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Abstract
The paper considers a class of decision problems with infinite time horizon that con-
tains Markov decision problems as an important special case. Our interest concerns
the case where the decision maker cannot commit himself to his future action choices.
We model the decision maker as consisting of multiple selves, where each history of
the decision problem corresponds to one self. Each self is assumed to have the same
utility function as the decision maker. We introduce the notions of Nash equilibrium,
subgame perfect equilibrium, and curb sets for decision problems. An optimal policy
at the initial history is a Nash equilibrium but not vice versa. Both subgame perfect
equilibria and curb sets are equivalent to subgame optimal policies. The concept of
a subgame optimal policy is therefore robust to the absence of commitment tech-
nologies.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we study a class of decision problems with infinite time horizon that con-
tains discounted Markov decision problems with a finite set of states and actions as an
important subclass. In every time period, nature selects a state. We take the perspective
of a decision maker that is informed about the state and has to take an action out of
a set of actions, thereby obtaining an instantaneous payoff and generating a, potentially
probabilistic, transition to a new state. This process is repeated indefinitely. Contrary
to Markov decision problems, we allow for history-dependent sets of available actions and
history-dependent state transitions.
Our main interest is in the case where the decision maker cannot commit himself to his
future actions. He is therefore modeled as consisting of multiple selves that have utility
functions identical to the one of the decision maker. Our emphasis is on the characterization
of policies that are consistent with Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium, and
sets of policies that are closed under rational behavior.
To obtain a benchmark, we start our analysis by considering a decision maker that can
commit himself to his future action choices. A policy of such a decision maker specifies a
profile of history-contingent action choices that are all feasible at the corresponding history.
A policy is optimal at a history if it maximizes the utility of the decision maker conditional
on reaching that history. A policy is subgame optimal if it maximizes the utility of the
decision maker at every history. We show the existence of subgame optimal policies and
show that the set of subgame optimal policies has a product structure. Moreover, we char-
acterize subgame optimal policies as a particular product of pure subgame optimal policies.
These results are completely in line with those derived for Markov decision problems, see
for instance the excellent overview by Puterman (1994).
We continue our analysis by assuming that the decision make cannot commit himself to
his future choices. He is fully aware of the actions and the payoff consequences of his future
actions, but cannot commit himself to any future choice. There are many examples where
the inability to commit to one future actions has drastic consequences. Famous examples
are given in the area of monetary policy by Kydland and Prescott (1977), where lack of
commitment leads to socially suboptimal decision making, and in durable goods monopoly
by Gul, Sonnenschein, and Wilson (1986), where the inability of the seller to commit to
future prices exerts a negative externality on its current decisions and reduces its profits.
The decision maker can only rely on the fact that his future self will make an optimal
choice. To study this case, we represent a decision problem as a stochastic game with
an infinite number of players. Each history of the decision problem is represented by one
player, who corresponds to one particular self of the decision maker. The utility functions
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of the players are all assumed to be identical to each other and equal to the one of the
decision maker.1 A strategy profile as chosen by the players is in a one-one correspondence
with a policy in the decision problem.
The standard way to solve a game is the concept of Nash equilibrium as proposed by
Nash (1950). At a Nash equilibrium of the decision problem, there is no self of the decision
maker who can benefit from taking another action, given that all other selves stick to
their actions. This approach to multiple-selves problems corresponds to the one suggested
by Peleg and Yaari (1973) in the context of consumption choice with time-inconsistent
preferences. We show that an optimal policy at the initial history is a Nash equilibrium,
but not vice versa, so a Nash equilibrium may fail to be an optimal policy at the initial
history. At a Nash equilibrium of the decision problem, the different selves may fail to
coordinate in a satisfactory way, leading to suboptimal behavior.
A well-known problem with the concept of Nash equilibrium is that it does not require
conditionally optimal behavior by players in subgames that are reached with probability
zero. We continue the analysis by considering the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium
as introduced in Selten (1965). We identify the subgames of a decision problem as decision
problems conditional on reaching a particular history. A subgame perfect equilibrium of a
decision problem is a strategy profile that is a Nash equilibrium of every decision problem
that corresponds to a subgame. This approach to multiple-selves problems corresponds
to the one suggested by Goldman (1980) in the context of consumption choice with time-
inconsistent preferences. We show that the set of subgame perfect equilibria of a decision
problem is equal to the set of subgame optimal policies.
A Nash equilibrium requires only that deviations are not profitable. So even the concept
of subgame perfect equilibrium, requiring that the strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium in
every subgame, does not require that unilateral deviations actually involve a loss, which is
required by the more demanding notion of strict equilibrium. Although a strict equilibrium,
and a fortiori a strict subgame perfect equilibrium, is more convincing as a stable strategy
profile, it is not guaranteed to exist in decision problems. We therefore turn to a set-valued
version of strict equilibrium as proposed by Basu and Weibull (1991) for games in normal
form with a finite number of players.
Basu and Weibull (1991) define a set of strategy profiles to be closed under rational
behavior (curb) if it contains all its best responses. A minimal curb set is a curb set that
does not contain any other curb set as a proper subset. Pruzhansky (2003) proposes a slight
variation on this notion for extensive games with perfect information and a finite horizon.
1Even if the decision maker is modeled as consisting of multiple selves, there is therefore no issue of
time-inconsistent preferences as introduced in Strotz (1956) and Pollak (1968). For an overview of that
stream of the literature, we refer the reader to Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue (2002).
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Myerson and Weibull (2015) define tenable strategy blocks, leading to a refinement of curb
sets.
We define a minimal curb set for a decision problem by requiring that every self of the
decision maker has a best response in the curb set conditional on his history being reached.
A curb set therefore captures the situation where every self of the decision maker chooses
an action that is a best response to some belief over action choices that are best responses
for the future selves conditional on the history of the current self being reached.
Voorneveld, Kets, and Norde (2005) point towards an important advantage of minimal
curb sets. Contrary to point-valued concepts as studied in the equilibrium selection lit-
erature, a minimal curb set satisfies the axiom of consistency, a notion that has been
introduced by Peleg and Tijs (1996) and Peleg, Potters and Tijs (1996). Consistency
requires that if a set of players plays the game according to a particular solution, then
the remaining players in the reduced game should not have an incentive to deviate from
it. Using consistency, Voorneveld, Kets, and Norde (2005) provide an axiomatization of
minimal curb sets.
Another advantage of minimal curb sets is that they are robust in a dynamic sense.
Hurkens (1995) studies a stochastic version of fictitious play in the spirit of Young (1993)
and shows that such a dynamic process of strategy adjustment will eventually settle down
in a minimal curb set. Similarly, Young (1998) presents a fictitious play process with inde-
pendent beliefs such that the stochastically stable states of the process correspond to the
minimal curb sets minimizing the stochastic potential, see also Durieu, Solal, and Tercieux
(2011) for the analysis of a more general class of fictitious play processes. Balkenborg, Hof-
bauer, and Kuzmics (2013) show how generalized best reply dynamics settle down within
a minimal CURB set based on the refined best reply correspondence. Further results on
the connection between learning dynamics and minimal CURB sets can be found in Kah
and Walzl (2015).
A curb set is said to be tight if it is exactly equal to its set of best responses. Since a
strict equilibrium corresponds to a singleton tight curb set, a tight curb set is indeed the
appropriate set-valued generalization of a strict equilibrium. We show that a minimal curb
set of a decision problem is tight. We also prove that a minimal curb set always exists, is
unique, and coincides with the set of pure subgame optimal policies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we define a class of decision
problems that contains Markov decision problems as a special case. Section 3 provides
the basic definitions related to policies and gives a characterization of subgame optimal
policies. We introduce multiple selves in Section 4, define and study the concepts of Nash
equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium of a decision problem and show the set of
subgame perfect equilibria to coincide with the set of subgame optimal policies. Section 5
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introduces the notion of a minimal curb set of a decision problem and shows that it coincides
with the set of pure subgame optimal policies. Section 6 concludes.
2 Decision Problems
A decision problem is described by the tuple D = (S,A,H, pi, f). Moves are made by nature
and the decision maker in an alternating fashion, where the decision maker chooses actions
in the non-empty, finite set of actions A and nature picks states in the non-empty, finite
set of states S. The payoff to the decision maker depends on the entire sequence of states
and actions thus produced. The class of decision problems that we study contains the class
of discounted Markov decision problems as a subclass. The element s0 is a distinguished
element of S called the initial state.
We let N = {0, 1, . . . } denote the set of natural numbers with 0. Each element h of
the set H is a finite sequence of the form h = (s0, a0, . . . , s`−1, a`−1, s`) where ` is a natural
number, s0, . . . , s` are elements of S and a0, . . . , a`−1 are elements of A. Elements of H are
called histories.
Given a history h = (s0, a0, . . . , s`−1, a`−1, s`) in H, we denote its length ` by `(h).
Moreover, for k = 0, . . . , `(h) − 1, we denote the state in period k by sk(h), the action
taken in period k by ak(h), and the current state s`(h)(h) by s∗(h).
Consider histories h and h′ in H, where h′ = (s0, a0, . . . , s`−1, a`−1, s`). The history h
is said to be a subhistory of h′ if h = (s0, a0, . . . , sk−1, ak−1, sk) for some k ≤ `. It is said to
be a proper subhistory of h′, if k < `. We write h ≤ h′ to denote that h is a subhistory of
h′, and h < h′ to denote that h is a proper subhistory of h′. The unique subhistory of h′
of length k is denoted by hk.
The set of actions available at a history h ∈ H is denoted by Ah, so
Ah = {a ∈ A | ∃s ∈ S such that (h, a, s) ∈ H}.
It is convenient to define the set G of nature histories, i.e. histories after which nature
selects the next state, as
G = {(h, a) ∈ H × A | a ∈ Ah}.
We extend the notions of subhistories and length to nature histories in the straightforward
way.
The set of states that may be reached at g ∈ G is denoted by Sg, so
Sg = {s ∈ S | (g, s) ∈ H}.
The set of histories H is assumed to have the following properties:
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1. For every h ∈ H, Ah 6= ∅.
2. For every g ∈ G, Sg 6= ∅.
3. For every h ∈ H, each subhistory of h is an element of H.
We do not impose any restriction on the set of available actions at a history h ∈ H,
apart from the existence of at least one such action. Similarly, we do not impose any
restriction on the set of possible states at a nature history g, apart from the existence of
at least one such state.
The function pi is a law of transition that assigns to each nature history g ∈ G a
probability distribution on the set Sg and thereby specifies the transition probabilities. We
let pi(s | g) ≥ 0 denote the probability that the system jumps from nature history g ∈ G
to state s ∈ Sg. Obviously, it holds that
∑
s∈Sg pi(s | g) = 1.
Consider an infinite sequence p = (s0, a0, s1, a1, . . . ). The sequence p is said to be a
play if the finite sequence (s0, a0, . . . , sk, ak) is an element of H for every k ∈ N. We let P
be the set of plays. We endow P with the topology generated by the basis of cylinder sets.
The payoff function f : P → R assigns payoffs to plays. Throughout this paper we assume
that the function f is continuous.
A decision problem proceeds as follows. At stage 0 the state is given to be s0. We let
h0 = (s0) be the first decision history encountered by the decision maker. The decision
then chooses an action a0 ∈ A(h0) and the transition to the next state s1 occurs with
probability pi(s1|h0, a0). We let h1 = (s0, a1, s1). The decision maker then chooses an
action a1 ∈ A(h1), and the transition to state s2 occurs with probability pi(s2|h1, a1).
This process continues ad infinitum. Nature and the decision maker thus produce a play
p = (s0, a0, s1, a1, s2, . . . ). The decision maker receives the payoff f(p).
An important subclass of decision problems are Markov decision problems. The decision
problem is said to be a discounted Markov decision problem if [1] the set of available actions
at a history depends only on the current state, [2] the transitions probabilities depend only
on the current state, and [3] there is a function u : S × A → R, called the instantaneous
payoff function, and a number δ ∈ (0, 1), called the discount factor, such that for any play
p = (s0, a0, s1, a1, . . . ) we have
f(p) =
∞∑
t=0
δtu(st, at).
Given a decision problem D as above and a history h = (s0, a0, . . . , s`−1, at−1, st) in H we
introduce a conditional decision problem Dh to be the problem that the decision maker faces
once the history h has occurred. The idea of such conditional decision problems is similar to
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the idea of a subgame in game theory. In the decision problem Dh the initial state is st. The
set of histories in Dh, denoted Hh, is the set of sequences h
′ = (s′0, a
′
0, . . . , s
′
`−1, a
′
`−1, s
′
`)
such that s′0 = st and the sequence (h, h
′) = (s0, a0, . . . , st, a′0, . . . , s
′
`−1, a
′
`−1, s
′
`) is an
element of H. We let Ph denote the set of plays of Dh. Transition probabilities in
Dh are defined in the obvious way and the payoff function is given by fh(p) = f(h, p)
for each play p = (s′0, a
′
0, s
′
1, a
′
1, . . . ) in Ph, where (h, p) denotes the infinite sequence
(s0, a0, . . . , st, a
′
0, s
′
1, a
′
1, . . . ). In particular, it holds that Ds0 = D.
3 Policies
In this section, we define various notions related to policies and characterize optimal
policies.
A policy is a function σ assigning to each history h ∈ H a probability distribution σ(h)
on the set Ah. The set of policies is denoted by Σ. A policy is said to be pure if for each
h ∈ H the distribution σ(h) assigns probability 1 to some particular action in Ah. For each
history h ∈ H, a policy σ of the decision problem D induces a policy σh in the decision
problem Dh by letting σh(h
′) = σ(h, h′) for each history h′ ∈ Hh.
We let U(σ) denote the expected payoff of the policy σ. Formally, U(σ) is the expected
value of the payoff function f with respect to the probability measure on P generated
by the policy σ and the law of transition pi. Similarly, we let Uh(σ) denote the expected
payoff of the policy σ conditional on the history h being reached. In particular, it holds
that Us0(σ) = U(σ). Equivalently, we let σh denote the policy in the decision problem Dh
induced by σ and observe that Uh(σ) is equal to the expected payoff of σh in the decision
problem Dh.
We let vh denote the value of the decision problem Dh, that is the highest expected
payoff that the decision maker can achieve, once the history h has occurred,
vh = sup
σ∈Σ
Uh(σ).
We write v = vs0 to denote the value of D. A policy σ ∈ Σ is optimal at the initial history if
U(σ) = v. It is optimal at history h ∈ H if Uh(σ) = vh. A policy σ ∈ Σ is subgame optimal
in D if it is optimal at every h ∈ H. Equivalently, σ is subgame optimal if for every h ∈ H
the policy σh is optimal at the initial history of the conditional decision problem Dh.
A subgame optimal policy is clearly optimal at the initial history, but the reverse may
not be true. If σ is optimal at the initial history, and if history h is reached with positive
probability under σ, then σ is also optimal at h. In general, however, a policy that is
optimal at the initial history need not be optimal at all histories, and hence it may fail to
be subgame optimal.
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The set of policies Σ endowed with the product topology is compact by the Tychonoff
product theorem. Since the payoff function Uh is continuous on Σ, an optimal policy at
history h always exists. We next consider a characterization of subgame optimal policies
in terms of one–day optimal actions, a result that is known in various guises in dynamic
programming, see Blackwell (1965) and stochastic games, see Shapley (1953).
The values defined above satisfy the following recursive relations:
vh = max
a∈Ah
∑
s∈S
pi(s|h, a) · vh,a,s. (3.1)
For h ∈ H, we let Oh denote the set of actions a ∈ Ah for which the maximum in (3.1) is
attained. Elements of Oh are called one–day optimal actions at h.
Theorem 3.1 A policy σ is subgame optimal if and only if for each h ∈ H the distribution
σ(h) only assigns positive probability to the actions in Oh.
Proof: To prove the only if part of the theorem, consider a subgame optimal policy σ.
For a history h ∈ H we have
vh = Uh(σ)
=
∑
a∈Ah
∑
s∈S
σ(h)(a) · pi(s|h, a) · Uh,a,s(σ)
=
∑
a∈Ah
σ(h)(a)
∑
s∈S
pi(s|h, a) · vh,a,s,
implying that σ(h) is supported by the set Oh.
To prove the if part of the theorem, consider a policy σ such that σ(h) only assigns
positive probability to the members of Oh. For t ∈ N, let σt denote a policy such that
[1] for every history h with length smaller than t, σt(h) = σ(h), and [2] for every history
h of length t, σ is optimal at h. Thus in particular σ0 is optimal at the initial history.
Unraveling the relation (3.1), we obtain U(σt) = v. Using the continuity of the function
U , and the fact that σt converges to σ as t → ∞, we obtain that U(σ) = v. A similar
argument shows that σ is optimal at each history h. 
It follows from the above theorem that a pure policy σ is subgame optimal if and only
if σ(h) ∈ Oh for every h ∈ H. The set of pure subgame optimal policies can therefore be
written as a cartesian product
∏
h∈H Oh, henceforth to be denoted by O. Similarly, the
entire set of subgame optimal policies can be written as a cartesian product
∏
h∈H ∆(Oh),
where ∆(Oh) denotes the set of probability distributions on Oh. Henceforth we denote∏
h∈H ∆(Oh) by ∆(O).
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If D is a discounted Markov decision problem with instantaneous payoff function u and
discount factor δ, then the conditional decision problem Dh and its value vh depend only
on the current state s∗(h) at h. We can then write vs to denote the value vh for any h with
s∗(h) = s. The relation (3.1) takes the form
vs = max
a∈As
{
u(s, a) + δ
∑
s′∈S
pi(s′|s, a) · vs′
}
.
For a Markov decision problem, a policy σ is optimal at the initial state s0 if Us0(σ) =
vs0 . The policy σ is said to be optimal in the Markov decision problem D if it is optimal
at each initial state, e.g. Puterman (1994). A classical result states that a discounted
Markov decision problem D has a stationary optimal policy. A stationary optimal policy
is also subgame optimal in the sense defined before. However, simple examples suffice to
show that a history dependent optimal policy need not be subgame optimal. Subgame
optimality is therefore a natural strengthening of optimality.
4 Multiple Selves
In this section, we take the perspective that the decision maker cannot commit himself to
his future actions. To do so, we model the decision maker as consisting of multiple selves.
This leads us to a game–theoretic model in which each history of the decision problem is
associated with a self. While all selves have the same payoff function, identical to the one
of the decision maker, they make their decisions independently. This potentially opens up
a possibility for miscoordination. In this section we analyze the game using the concepts
of both Nash and subgame perfect equilibrium.
Let D be a decision problem as in Section 2. At each history, the current self of the
decision maker is free to take any action. Every possible history h ∈ H therefore leads
to a self of the decision maker, also referred to as a player. A pure strategy of player h
is an element of Ah and a mixed strategy is an element of ∆(Ah), the set of probability
distributions on Ah. A profile σ = (σ(h))h∈H of mixed strategies describes a strategy choice
for each player. Notice that as a mathematical object, a strategy profile is equivalent to a
policy. The utility function of every player h ∈ H is the same and is identical to the one
of the decision maker at the initial history, U .
We start our discussion by applying the concept of Nash equilibrium to the decision
problem D viewed as a game played by multiple selves. A strategy profile is a Nash
equilibrium of D if no player can improve the payoff at the initial period by a unilateral
deviation. More precisely, σ ∈ Σ is a Nash equilibrium if for every h ∈ H and for every
8
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Figure 1: A decision problem with a Nash equilibrium that is not optimal at the initial
history.
η(h) ∈ ∆(Ah) it holds that U(σ) ≥ U(σ/η(h)), where σ/η(h) denotes the strategy profile
obtained from σ by replacing its coordinate σ(h) by η(h).
If a policy σ∗ ∈ Σ is optimal at the initial history, then it is a Nash equilibrium of D.
For recall that by definition a policy that is optimal at the initial history maximizes the
payoff function U over the entire set of policies. Thus in particular no unilateral deviation
from σ∗ can improve the payoff.
The following example shows that the converse is not necessarily the case: a Nash
equilibrium of D may fail to be an optimal policy at the initial history. Thus, under the
concept of Nash equilibrium, multiple selves can severely fail to coordinate.
Example 4.1 Consider the decision problem depicted in Figure 1. Formally, this could
be modeled as a decision problem D where the set of states S is a singleton, the set of
actions is A = {a, b}, the set H consists of all sequences (s0, a0, . . . , s0) where at ∈ A and
s0 is the only state, and f(p) depends on the play p = (s0, a0, s0, a0, . . . ) only through its
coordinates a0 and a1 as follows: f(p) = 0 if a0 = a or if a0 = b and a1 = a, and f(p) = 1
otherwise.
Obviously, playing a0 = a1 = b is an optimal policy at the initial history. However, the
decision problem D has another Nash equilibrium: playing action a at both periods 0 and
1. Indeed, a unilateral deviation by player s0, the player active at the root of the tree, to
action b is not profitable, because player (s0, b, s0) is assumed to stick with action b. The
unilateral deviation to action b by player (s0, b, s0) is not profitable, because player s0 plays
a, so that player (s0, b, s0) has no effect on the payoff. This second Nash equilibrium leads
to a strictly lower payoff than an optimal policy at the initial history.
We presently turn to the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium. We argue that in
a subgame perfect equilibrium, full coordination obtains. More precisely, we show that
the set of subgame perfect equilibrium strategy profiles coincides with the set of subgame
optimal policies.
A strategy profile is a subgame perfect equilibrium if it induces a Nash equilibrium in
each subgame. Thus σ ∈ Σ is a subgame perfect equilibrium if for every h ∈ H the strategy
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profile σh is a Nash equilibrium of Dh. Equivalently, σ is a subgame perfect equilibrium of
D if for every h ∈ H and every η(h) ∈ ∆(Ah) it holds that Uh(σ) ≥ Uh(σ/η(h)).
Theorem 4.2 Let D be a decision problem. A policy is subgame optimal if and only if it
is a subgame perfect equilibrium of D.
Proof: Suppose a policy σ is subgame optimal. Then for every history h ∈ H the policy
σ is optimal at history h. Hence σh is a Nash equilibrium of Dh. We conclude that σ is a
subgame perfect equilibrium of D.
Conversely, suppose a policy σ is subgame perfect equilibrium of D. Let η be an
arbitrary policy. For t ∈ N, let σt be the strategy profile defined as follows: Let σt(h)
be equal to η(h) for each history h with length smaller than t and be equal to σ(h) for a
history h of length at least t. In particular, it holds that σ0 = σ.
It is sufficient to show that, for every h ∈ H, for every t ∈ N,
Uh(σ
t) ≥ Uh(σt+1). (4.1)
Indeed, using the continuity of Uh and the fact that σ
t converges to η as t goes to infinity,
one then concludes that Uh(σ
0) ≥ Uh(η), as desired.
We continue by proving (4.1). Take some t ∈ N. If `(h) ≥ t + 1 then σth = σt+1h = σh,
so (4.1) holds with equality.
Consider a history h of length `(h) = t. Since σh is a Nash equilibrium in Dh, the
player active at history h does not profit from a unilateral deviation from σ(h) to η(h).
Notice that such a deviation induces the strategy profile σt+1h in Dh. We conclude that
(4.1) is satisfied.
Finally, we use induction to prove (4.1) for histories of length 0, . . . , t. We already know
that (4.1) holds for all histories of length t. Suppose we have proven (4.1) for all histories
of length k + 1 ∈ {1, . . . , t}. Consider a history h of length `(h) = k. It holds that
Uh(σ
t) =
∑
a∈Ah
∑
s∈S
η(h)(a)pi(s|h, a)U(h,a,s)(σt)
≥
∑
a∈Ah
∑
s∈S
η(h)(a)pi(s|h, a)U(h,a,s)(σt+1) = Uh(σt+1),
where the inequality follows by the induction hypothesis. This completes the induction
step and the proof of the theorem. 
The following corollary follows immediately from the preceding theorem.
Corollary 4.3 Let D be a decision problem. A pure policy is subgame optimal if and only
if it is a pure subgame perfect equilibrium of D.
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Figure 2: A normal-form game with an unstable Nash equilibrium.
5 Sets Closed Under Rational Behavior
Although we have derived an equivalence between the subgame optimal policies and the
subgame perfect equilibria of a decision problem, one may still criticize the lack of stability
of Nash equilibrium for the decision problems at the various histories. The problem is
essentially that a Nash equilibrium only requires a deviation not to be profitable, rather
than requiring that it actually involves a loss. The concept of strict equilibrium addresses
this issue, but may fail to exist. For instance, in a decision problem where a player h ∈ H
can choose between two distinct best responses, a strict equilibrium does not exist.
The following example is taken from Basu and Weibull (1991) to illustrate that indif-
ferences of a player about what action to take can make a Nash equilibrium unstable.
Example 5.1 Consider the normal-form game depicted in Figure 2. This game has a
unique Nash equilibrium where player 1 randomizes between T and M with probability
2/3 and 1/3, respectively, and player 2 randomizes between L and R with probability 1/4
and 3/4, respectively. Under the Nash equilibrium beliefs, player 1 is indifferent between
T and M and player 2 is indifferent between L and R. If player 2 believes that player 1
is going to choose M with probability above 1/3, a belief that is quite natural given that
player 1 is indifferent between T and M, then player 2’s unique best response is L. And if
player 1 believes it to be quite likely that player 2 chooses L, then his unique best response
is B. It therefore is not justified to exclude B as a reasonable choice for player 1.
To address the instability of Nash equilibrium, Basu and Weibull (1991) consider
minimal sets of strategy profiles that are closed under rational behavior (curb) for normal-
form games with a finite number of players. In this section, we define curb sets for decision
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problems. We show that a minimal curb set is unique and equal to the set of pure subgame
perfect equilibria, so therefore equal to the set of pure subgame optimal policies by virtue
of Corollary 4.3.
Let D be a decision problem as in Section 2. We say that a subset X of
∏
h∈H Ah
is a product set if X =
∏
h∈H Xh for some Xh ⊆ Ah. Let B denote the collection of all
non–empty products sets. For every X ∈ B, we define the subset ∆(X) of Σ as the set of
strategy profiles σ such that for every h ∈ H the support of σ(h) is contained in Xh. Thus
∆(X) is of the following form,
∆(X) =
∏
h∈H
∆(Xh).
We recall that the set of pure subgame optimal policies, denoted O, is a product set, with
its factor Oh being the set of one–day optimal actions at h, and that ∆(O) is the set of
subgame optimal policies of D.
The set of pure best responses by player h ∈ H at history h against a strategy profile
σ ∈ Σ is defined by
bh(σ) = arg max
a(h)∈Ah
Uh(σ/a(h)). (5.1)
Note that the pure strategy profile σ is a subgame perfect equilibrium of D precisely when
σ(h) ∈ bh(σ) for every h ∈ H.
We proceed to define the function µ : B → B, called the curb operator for D, as follows:
For every X ∈ B, let
µh(X) =
⋃
σ∈∆(X)
bh(σ),
and
µ(X) =
∏
h∈H
µh(X) =
∏
h∈H
⋃
σ∈∆(X)
bh(σ).
Thus a pure policy η is an element of µ(X) if for every player h ∈ H there exists a policy
σ ∈ ∆(X) such that η(h) is player h’s best response to σ. Essential to this definition is
the order of quantification. It reflects the fact that different players are allowed to hold
different, and incompatible, beliefs about their future selves.
Definition 5.2 Let D be a decision problem. A set X ∈ B is closed under rational behavior
(curb) if µ(X) ⊆ X. A curb set is minimal if it does not contain any curb set as a proper
subset.
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The set of pure strategy profiles X is curb if in case all players believe that actions
outside X are played with probability 0 implies that rational players will only play actions
inside X. Since the curb criterion is met by the set X =
∏
h∈H Ah of all pure strategy
profiles, we are particularly interested in minimal curb sets.
For normal form games with a finite number of players, Basu and Weibull (1991) show
that a minimal curb set always exists, though it may not be unique. The next result claims
that also every decision problem has at least one minimal curb set.
Theorem 5.3 Let D be a decision problem. Then D has at least one minimal curb set.
Proof: Clearly, the set
∏
h∈H Ah is a curb set. Let C be the collection of all curb sets. We
define the partial order ⊇ on C in the usual way, so for X,X ′ ∈ C it holds that X ⊇ X ′ if
and only if, for every h ∈ H, Xh ⊇ X ′h.
Let D be a subset of C that is totally ordered by ⊇. We define X ′ = ∩X∈DX. Since D
is totally ordered by ⊇ and, for every X ∈ D, for every h ∈ H, Xh is finite, it follows that
X ′ is non–empty.
We show X ′ to be a curb set. For every X ∈ D, since X ⊇ X ′, it holds that µ(X) ⊇
µ(X ′). It follows that
X ′ = ∩X∈DX ⊇ ∩X∈Dµ(X) ⊇ µ(X ′),
where the first inclusion follows from the fact that every X in D is a curb set. We have
shown that X ′ is a curb set.
The set X ′ is an upper bound on D, hence, by Zorn’s lemma, it holds that C has at least
one maximal element. A maximal element of C with respect to ⊇ is a minimal curb set. 
A strict subgame perfect equilibrium is a pure strategy profile σ such that µ({σ}) =
{σ}, so is a singleton curb set. The set-valued generalization of a strict subgame perfect
equilibrium is a curb set X such that µ(X) = X.
Definition 5.4 Let D be a decision problem. A curb set X is tight if µ(X) = X.
A tight curb set has the desirable property that none of its elements can be deleted if
players hold beliefs in ∆(X). For normal-form games with a finite number of players, Basu
and Weibull (1991) show that a minimal curb set is always tight. The next result states
that also for decision problems every minimal curb set is tight.
Theorem 5.5 Let D be a decision problem. If X is a minimal curb set of D, then X is
tight.
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Proof: Let X be a minimal curb set of D. Since µ(X) ⊆ X, it holds that µ(µ(X)) ⊆ µ(X),
so µ(X) is a curb set. Since the curb set X is minimal and µ(X) ⊆ X, it follows that
µ(X) = X, so the curb set X is tight. 
The next result shows that the set of pure subgame optimal policies is a minimal curb
set. We have not yet ruled out the possibility that there are other minimal curb sets.
Theorem 5.6 Let D be a decision problem. Then the set of pure subgame optimal policies
O is a minimal curb set of D.
Proof: We first argue that for each σ ∈ ∆(O) it holds that bh(σ) = Oh. To see this, take
some σ ∈ ∆(O) and consider the maximization problem (5.1). Defining a = a(h), we can
write
Uh(σ/a(h)) =
∑
s∈S
pi(s|h, a) · Uh,a,s(σ) =
∑
s∈S
pi(s|h, a) · vh,a,s.
Hence, the maximum in (5.1) equals vh. It is reached if and only if a is an element of Oh.
It follows that µ(O) = O, so that O is a curb set. To see that O is a minimal curb set,
let X be a curb set such that X ⊆ O. Take any σ ∈ X. Since bh(σ) = Oh for every h ∈ H,
we have O ⊆ µ(X) ⊆ X, and therefore X = O. 
A normal-form game can have several minimal curb sets. The next result shows that
the minimal curb set of a decision problem is unique and therefore equal to O.
Theorem 5.7 Let D be a decision problem. Then O is the unique minimal curb set of D.
Proof:
Step 1: Let X be a curb set of D. Then the function U is constant on X.
Let D′ = (S,A,H ′, pi′, f ′) be the decision problem that is identical to D, except that
the set of actions at a history h ∈ H ′ is restricted to Xh, so H ′ consists of histories h such
that ak(h) ∈ Xhk for each k ∈ {0, . . . , `(h) − 1}. The set G′ ⊆ G contains the nature
histories corresponding to H ′ and pi′ is the restriction of pi to G′, and f ′ is the restriction
of f to plays of D′. Let v′ denote the value of D′ and µ′ its curb operator. Let O′ be the
set of pure subgame optimal policies of D′. By Theorem 5.6, O′ is a minimal curb set of
D′.
We prove Step 1 by showing that U(σ) = v′ for each σ ∈ X.
For h ∈ H, define X ′h to be equal to O′h if h ∈ H ′ and to be equal to Xh if h ∈ H \H ′.
Let X ′ =
∏
h∈H X
′
h. We argue that X
′ is a curb set of D. Since X ′ ⊆ X, we have that
µ(X ′) ⊆ µ(X) ⊆ X. In particular, for h ∈ H \ H ′ we have µh(X ′) ⊆ Xh = X ′h. Now
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consider h ∈ H ′. We argue that µh(X ′) ⊆ O′h. Take a policy σ ∈ ∆(X ′) in D and let σ′ be
the restriction of σ to histories in H ′. Thus σ′ is a policy in D′ and σ′ ∈ ∆(O′).
Consider an action a ∈ bh(σ), i.e. player h’s best response to σ in D. Since a ∈ µh(X) ⊆
Xh, a is a feasible action for player h in D
′. It then follows that a is a best response of
player h to σ′ in D′, so that a ∈ b′h(σ′). This establishes that µh(X ′) ⊆ µ′h(O′). Since
µ′h(O
′) ⊆ O′h, we obtain µh(X ′) ⊆ O′h. It holds that µh(X ′) ⊆ X ′h for all h ∈ H, as desired.
Since X ′ is a curb set of D, X is a minimal curb set of D, and X ′ ⊆ X, we conclude
that X ′ = X. Thus, in particular, it holds that O′h = Xh for all h ∈ H ′.
Now take a policy σ ∈ X and let σ′ be the restriction of σ to histories in H ′. It is
clear that the measure induced by σ from the initial state s0 on the set P of plays of D is
supported by P ′, the set of plays of D′. Consequently, U(σ) equals the payoff of σ′ in D′.
But since σ′ ∈ O′, the payoff on σ′ in D′ is exactly v′. We conclude that U(σ) = v′.
Step 2: Let X be a curb set of D. Then, for every h ∈ H, the function Uh is constant on
X.
Take a history h ∈ H and consider the decision problem Dh. The set Y =
∏
h′∈Hh X(h,h′)
is curb for the decision problem Dh. By Step 1, the payoff function Uh is constant on Y .
The result follows.
Step 3: Let X be a curb set of D. Then it holds that X ⊆ O.
Take any σ ∈ X and suppose that σ /∈ O. By Corollary 4.3, σ is not a subgame perfect
equilibrium of D. Consequently, there exists h ∈ H such that σ(h) /∈ bh(σ). Hence, for
a(h) ∈ bh(σ), we have Uh(σ/a(h)) > Uh(σ). Since X is a curb set, it holds that bh(σ) ⊆ Xh.
Thus a(h) is an element of Xh, and hence σ/a(h) is an element of X. This is a contradiction
to Step 2. The result of Step 3 follows.
Finally, since X is a curb set while O is a minimal curb set, we conclude that X = O.
Thus O is the only minimal curb set of D, as desired. 
6 Conclusions
The standard analysis of decision problems assumes perfect commitment of the decision
maker. In this paper, we take the perspective that the decision maker cannot commit to
his future action choices. The decision maker is therefore modeled as consisting of multiple
selves. The current self of the decision maker has to form beliefs regarding the behavior of
his future selves.
We study a class of infinite horizon decision problems that contains the class of Markov
decision problems as a special case. We formulate the concepts of optimality at a history
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and subgame optimality for a policy as a benchmark. These concepts implicitly assume
that the decision maker can commit to his future action choices. We argue that these
concepts are robust with respect to the multiple selves model under fairly weak assumptions
regarding the rationality of future selves. Both the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium
and the concept of closed under rational behavior yields the set of subgame optimal policies
as the unique prediction. Only a concept like Nash equilibrium that makes significantly
weaker assumptions with respect to the rationality of future selves leads to a wider class
of policies.
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